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China and world politics: three insights

At the virtual event entitled ‘KOF Beyond the Borders’ on 26 May, Markus Herrmann, co-founder and Managing Director of the China Macro Group, Lars Brozus, Deputy Head of the Global Issues Research Group at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, and KOF economist Vera Eichenauer discussed the topic of ‘Power shifts in the world system: what role does Europe play?’. The event was moderated by KOF staff member Sina Freiermuth. We have summarised the three most important findings of the discussion.

From multilateralism to multiple crises – historical evolution:
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, a ‘period of détente’ prevailed on the world political stage in the 1990s, according to Lars Brozus’ analysis. Even Russia and China showed themselves to be cooperative during this time, for example, when it came to environmental issues or women’s rights. Multilateralism – i.e. several states working together to solve political, social and technical problems – worked relatively well. Examples of this were the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and the UN World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. China even joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.

As Lars Brozus explained during the further course of his presentation, however, world politics entered a period of increasing turmoil from the turn of the millennium onwards. Above all, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the financial crisis unleashed in 2007 tipped international relations and the global economy into a state of disequilibrium. The Arab Spring, the so-called ‘colour revolutions’ in Georgia and Ukraine and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 also changed the geopolitical situation. The United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union in 2020 (‘Brexit’) and the ‘America first’ policy pursued by the then (2017-2021) US President Donald Trump challenged multilateralism not only practically but also conceptually.

By the time the COVID-19 pandemic had begun in 2020, according to Brozus, we found ourselves in an age of multiple crises. This had three characteristics: the replacement of the multilateral world order by a multipolar one, as the systemic rivalry between the US and China and the war in Ukraine illustrate; a connectivity crisis that exposes the weaknesses of the global division of labour, as exemplified by pandemic-related supply chain problems; and finally, global transformation challenges characterised by the need to manage climate change and sustainable development, which puts social cohesion in many countries under pressure.

The Taiwan conflict – seven scenarios:
The rivalry between China and Taiwan currently poses one of the most important geopolitical risks alongside the war in Ukraine. In his presentation, Markus Herrmann outlined seven scenarios of how the conflict could develop. First, there was speculation about the possibility of a swift invasion triggered by political factional infighting within the party leadership before the 20th party congress in October 2022, although this did not materialise (scenario 1). Other scenarios include an invasion launched in 2027, once China has achieved the formal goal of modernising its armed forces according to the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) (scenario 2), and a non-military negotiated settlement in the 2030s, in which China could bring its economic and political might to bear (scenario 3).

Furthermore, events outside China could introduce a new dynamic into the conflict, such as a change of government in the US in 2024 or 2028 (scenario 4) or a strengthening of the independence movement in Taiwan’s elections in the same years (scenario 5). But there are also scenarios in which the status quo is perpetuated, namely if a mutual deterrence equilibrium is achieved in the long term (scenario 6) or if the conflict is de-escalated thanks to the adoption of a less aggressive and more friendly policy stance in Beijing and Taipei (scenario 7).

Addressing these scenarios, Markus Herrmann finally mentioned various reasons why, in his view, we are unlikely to see any short-term escalation in the Taiwan Strait. These include the fact that military deterrence seems to be working; there are still critical dependencies on Taiwan’s production of semiconductors in particular; China’s military has not yet been modernised; the outcome of Russia’s war against Ukraine is not yet clear; there are serious conflicts between these objectives and the domestic priorities of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership; the Communist Party’s preference for a non-military solution remains unchanged; and, finally, Wang Huning, a senior politician in the CCP and a close adviser to Party Chairman Xi Jinping, has been entrusted with the task of devising an innovative Taiwan policy that aims to focus more on the interpersonal dimension.

The war in Ukraine and China’s role:
All experts agree that the systemic rivalry between China and the US is key to understanding the war in Ukraine and its potential resolution. While China is not supplying weapons to Russia, it has avoided officially labelling Russia as the aggressor and speaks trivially of a ‘Ukraine conflict’. This strategy of ‘pro-Russian neutrality’ is rooted in China’s dual dependence on both the West and Russia, with whom China shares a 4,000-kilometre national border. On the one hand, the Chinese economy is closely interconnected with the United States and Europe through globalisation. On the other hand, according to Markus Herrmann, China is also dependent on its neighbour and longstanding strategic partner Russia for energy, food and military supplies.